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Abstract
Background: Access to safe surgical care represents a critical gap in healthcare delivery and development in many
low- and middle-income countries, including Ethiopia. Quality improvement (QI) initiatives at hospital level may
contribute to closing this gap. Many such quality improvement initiatives are carried out through international
health partnerships. Better understanding of how to optimise quality improvement in low-income settings is needed,
including through partnership-based approaches. Drawing on a process evaluation of an intervention to improve
surgical services in an Ethiopian hospital, this paper offers lessons to help meet this need.
Methods: We conducted a qualitative process evaluation of a quality improvement project which aimed to improve
access to surgical services in an Ethiopian referral hospital through better management. Data was collected longitudinally
and included: 66 in-depth interviews with surgical staff and project team members; observation (135 h) in the surgery
department and of project meetings; project-related documentation. Thematic analysis, guided by theoretical constructs,
focused on identifying obstacles to implementation.
Results: The project largely failed to achieve its goals. Key barriers related to project design, partnership working
and the implementation context, and included: confusion over project objectives and project and partner roles
and responsibilities; logistical challenges concerning overseas visits; difficulties in communication; gaps between
the time and authority team members had and that needed to implement and engage other staff; limited strategies
for addressing adaptive—as opposed to technical—challenges; effects of hierarchy and resource scarcity on QI efforts.
While many of the obstacles identified are common to diverse settings, our findings highlight ways in which some
features of low-income country contexts amplify these common challenges.
Conclusion: We identify lessons for optimising the design and planning of quality improvement interventions within
such challenging healthcare contexts, with specific reference to international partnership-based approaches. These
include: the need for a funded lead-in phase to clarify and agree goals, roles, mutual expectations and communication
strategies; explicitly incorporating adaptive, as well as technical, solutions; transparent management of resources and
opportunities; leadership which takes account of both formal and informal power structures; and articulating links
between project goals and wider organisational interests.
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Background
Access to safe surgical care represents a critical gap in
health service delivery and development in many low-
and middle-income countries [1, 2], including Ethiopia
[3]. Increased infrastructure and human resources are
essential to address such national deficits in surgical capa-
city [4], and the Ethiopian government has embarked on
an ambitious programme of healthcare reform which aims
to increase human resources and improve hospital infra-
structure. In May 2016, the Federal Ministry of Health
also launched the Saving Lives Through Safe Surgery
initiative (SALTS), which aims to promote safe surgery
throughout the country to alleviate the national burden
of diseases. While necessary, increased resources at a
national level are unlikely to be sufficient on their own,
however. Research from low-income countries also high-
lights the need for improved management and organisa-
tion of resources within hospitals [5], indicating that
quality improvement at this level also has an important
role to play in enhancing access to safe care [6–8].
Improving healthcare quality and safety is notoriously
difficult [9, 10], and the results of improvement inter-
ventions are often disappointing [11]. Analysis of the
reasons that interventions fail to achieve the desired re-
sults is essential if the science of healthcare improvement
is to move forward [12]. While much has been learnt
about the determinants of successful quality improvement
efforts, the vast majority of research and evaluation per-
tains to high-income country settings. Yet the role of con-
text in influencing whether and how an intervention
‘works’ is significant [11]. There is a particular need, there-
fore, to develop understanding of how to optimise quality
improvement efforts in low-income (LIC) country settings
[6]. An essential component of this endeavour is the use
of process evaluations that examine how an intervention is
enacted and help to identify barriers and facilitators to
implementation [9, 13, 14].
One prominent approach to quality improvement efforts
in LICs involves international collaborations with partners
from high-income countries. Such international partner-
ships form an increasingly prominent approach to tackling
healthcare quality and safety in Ethiopia, as elsewhere in
Sub-Saharan Africa [15, 16]. International partnership
initiatives in the Ethiopian context include, for example,
the Clinton Health Access Initiative (which works with
the government on a range of programs to improve
access to and quality of health services), the World
Health Organization’s (WHO) African Partnerships for
Patient Safety programme (which supports and facili-
tates learning across hospital-to-hospital partnerships),
and numerous institutional health partnerships between
hospitals and/or universities in Ethiopia and high-income
countries such as the UK. While advocated as a potentially
valuable component in efforts to strengthen health services
[17], including surgical services [18], international partner-
ships can be challenging and their impact is often mixed.
Partnerships frequently face challenges relating to di-
vergences in language, interests, priorities, and access
to resources and education; these can lead to difficulties
ensuring equal stakeholder involvement, ownership and
commitment and in ensuring mutual understanding,
clarity of purpose and coordination of collaborative
efforts [19–22]. In addition to the obstacles presented
by challenging implementation contexts, such difficulties
can lead to failure to establish partnerships (or their break-
down), and limited or patchy success in achieving some or
all of the goals of a specific project (such as improvements
in health research capacity or healthcare quality and safety)
[21–24]. Many hospital-to-hospital partnerships lack the
resources to carry out in-depth process evaluation of
their improvement initiatives [25], curtailing opportuni-
ties for much-needed documentation and sharing of
learning [13, 26].
In this paper we report on the findings of a qualita-
tive process evaluation of a quality improvement pro-
ject in an Ethiopian University Hospital (anonymized as
Borodar University Hospital). The project was designed
and implemented in partnership with a UK hospital
(anonymized as Glennworth) through the pre-existing
Borodar-Glennworth partnership - a partnership which
had been active for over a decade. The project, anonymized
as the Surgical Capacity Improvement (SCI) project, aimed
to strengthen the organisation and management of surgical
services in Borodar University Hospital, a regional tertiary
care centre serving over five million residents. At the start
of the project (2011), the hospital had 500 beds, and per-
formed ~6000 major surgical procedures annually across
four operating rooms (ORs). Like many facilities which
provide surgical services in Ethiopia [4], the context
was a challenging one characterized by limited (albeit
increasing) human resources (particularly anaesthetists
and nurses) and unreliable access to electricity, running
water, essential medications and equipment.
The SCI project was funded by a UK-based trust which
supports partnership-based healthcare projects, and was
implemented over 18 months. The project’s overarching
goal was to improve access to surgical services for patients
in Borodar based on the rationale that significant im-
provements could be made through better management
of existing (albeit limited) resources. It sought to achieve
this goal by: establishing a multi-disciplinary OR manage-
ment committee; training all theatre staff in management
skills; reducing ‘down-time’ in the OR and increasing
through-put; and establishing clinical record-keeping and
audit as routine management tools.
By the end of the 18-month implementation period,
many of the proposed activities had not been imple-
mented and almost none of the project objectives had
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been met. We sought to explain why. Through a process
evaluation which examined project implementation and
the implementation context, we identify key factors that
contributed to the disappointing results of the project. We
discuss the lessons for future improvement interventions,
particularly those involving international partnerships.
Methods
An independent, qualitative process evaluation of the
SCI project was conducted (October 2011-January 2014)
as part of a larger ethnographic study of international
partnerships and efforts to improve healthcare quality and
safety. The process evaluation aimed to examine how the
project was enacted, with a focus on: implementation pro-
cesses (how and with what degree of fidelity planned
inputs, activities and strategies were implemented); how
project partners and participants engaged with the inter-
vention; and context characteristics which influenced im-
plementation [12, 14].
Evaluation data comprised interview, observation and
documentary data relating to the SCI project. This in-
cluded 66 semi-structured interviews carried out at three
time points: 22 at the start of the SCI project, 30 one
year into the SCI project and 14 after the project had
finished (Table 1). These time-points enabled longitudinal
study of project implementation, from initial launch and
development of implementation plans, through the imple-
mentation period to reflections following the end of project
funding. We interviewed three categories of participants:
1) Glennworth partners (health professionals) involved in
the SCI project (nine); 2) Borodar partners directly in-
volved in the SCI project (seven); 3) Borodar surgical
staff, including surgeons, trainees, anaesthetists, nurses
and cleaners (35). All original SCI Borodar committee
members were interviewed at least twice; two of the
Glennworth project leads were interviewed twice; five
other Borodar OR staff were interviewed twice. Interviews
were conducted by ELA or AN (see Acknowledgements)
in English or Amharic, translated (where necessary) and
transcribed verbatim. Interviews covered views of the SCI
project (aims, activities, achievements and obstacles), of
the partnership and - to facilitate exploration of the imple-
mentation context - of problems encountered in routine
OR functioning (see Additional file 1). ELA and AN were
independent researchers, not directly involved in running
the SCI project; nonetheless ELA in particular may have
been seen by some as associated with the project due to
shared institutional connections with the UK project team.
This may have influenced participants’ responses; mea-
sures to reflexively take account of this possibility were
taken in the approach to interviews, triangulation with
other data sources and during analysis.
ELA and AN also conducted 135 h of observations in
the operating rooms before the project started, during
the project and after the project had ended. This allowed
us to observe efforts to implement changes through the
SCI project, as well as routine functioning of the OR in
order to gain understanding of the implementation con-
text. ELA observed two meetings of Glennworth part-
ners concerning the SCI project; the second meeting
took place after the project had finished and included
discussion of what had ‘gone wrong’ during the SCI pro-
ject. Brief notes were jotted down during observations,
then typed up in full by ELA. We also collected docu-
ments relating to the SCI, including the project proposal,
reports to the funder and visit reports. Triangulation
between data sources allowed us to build a holistic pic-
ture of the project activities, the implementation con-
text and the challenges encountered.
Given the outcomes of the project, our analysis focused
specifically on identifying the barriers and challenges to
implementation. Data was coded by author ELA, using
Nvivo (QSR) software, and the analysis was discussed,
reviewed and agreed on by all authors. Thematic analysis
of the data drew on theoretical constructs relating to col-
laborative projects [27, 28] to examine the components of
the improvement intervention and their influence on
outcomes. Specifically, we directed our analysis towards
examination of participants’ understandings of: the pro-
ject itself (its objectives and the strategies and resources
proposed/needed to achieve these); the formal and in-
formal rules and mechanisms guiding project team and
partner interactions and communication; the division of
labour among partners and project team members; and
the engagement of the wider OR community in the pro-
ject. Recognising the importance of contextual influences,
we also sought to characterise the ways in which the
implementation context shaped and constrained these
intervention components. In line with our theoretical
framework, the next step was to identify what Engeström
Table 1 Number and role of interview participants
Pre-project
implementation
Project
implementation phase
Post-project
end
UK SCI project
team
3 6 1
Borodar SCI
project team
4 5 5
Borodar OR staff 15 19 8
Anaesthetic
staff
4 6 2
Surgeon &
Obs-Gyn staff
6 8 5
OR nurses 5 6 5
Other OR staff 4 4 1
Total 22 30 14
Grand total 66
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[27] calls ‘contradictions’ within the system, i.e., mis-
matches between components, between components
and context or between the perspectives of different
stakeholders on these components. Such contradictions
have the potential to undermine collaboration and pro-
ject implementation [28].
Results
The overarching goal of the SCI project was to improve
access to the OR in terms of increased through-put of
cases, reduced delays and decreased closure of individual
ORs due to lack of equipment or drugs. Table 2 summa-
rises the SCI objectives, the activities proposed to facili-
tate meeting these objectives, and the achievements of
the SCI as reported in interviews and project documen-
tation (funding proposal, reports to funder).
Despite a great deal of initial enthusiasm for the SCI
project from both teams and Borodar hospital manage-
ment, and the dedication of significant time and effort
from all team members, all partners agreed that the posi-
tive impacts on OR management they hoped for had not
materialised. Most objectives had not been met and many
activities were not implemented. An initial ‘launch’ meet-
ing between Glennworth team leads and Borodar team
leads was held (in Glennworth) to review the project
proposal and plan initial steps. Following this meeting,
the Borodar team leads (the hospital CEO and clinical
director) identified four ‘frontline’ members (a nurse, an
anaesthetist, a surgical resident and an obstetrics resident)
to work alongside them to form the OR improvement
committee. However, the committee only held two
meetings during the 18-month project period. Two
further visits were undertaken (one by two OR manage-
ment committee members to Glennworth, the other by
two Glennworth OR professionals to Borodar), but the
proposed leadership and management training work-
shops for OR staff did not take place. The nurse repre-
sentative on the committee did, though, provide
training for OR nurses in waste management processes
following his visit to the UK. Apart from a 6-week audit
of cancelled procedures, routine clinical audits were
not established, nor a review panel or regular OR audit
Table 2 Summary of project objectives, proposed activities and reported achievements
Project objectives Proposed activities Achievements
Overarching project objective: To improve
access to the operating theatres for both
surgical and obstetric patients in Borodar,
by increasing the number of procedures
and decreasing delays and periods
of closure
Audits to assess:
-Number of acute and elective procedures
-Delays for acute obstetric emergencies
-Amount of time ORs closed due to lack of
functioning equipment or drugs
-None of the proposed audits were
completed.
-6-week audit of cancellations completed
but not seen by all partners/project team
members
-No anecdotal evidence or reported
observation of any improvement in
through-put, delays or periods of closure
To meet objectives and carry out activites
through on-going collaboration between
Borodar and Glennworth partners
-Ongoing support and dialogue between
partners via email
-One visit by Borodar OR committee
members to UK
-Two visits by two Glennworth OR
professionals to run training workshops and
support the OR management committee
-Efforts to maintain dialogue between
partners enacted, but significant challenges
and misunderstandings reported
-Two visits by Borodar OR committee
members to UK were undertaken, though
later than scheduled
-One visit by Glennworth OR professionals
to Borodar, though later than scheduled
and training workshops not held.
To improve OR management through
establishment of a functional, multi-
disciplinary OR management team
-Identify and establish OR management
team to include representatives of surgery,
obstetrics, anaesthesia and nursing
-Hold regular, minuted meetings.
-OR management committee members
identified
-Only two meetings held during 18-month
project period
To train all OR professionals in OR leadership
and management skills
-Run four two-day workshops on leadership
and management for all qualified staff using
the operating theatres and recovery
(about 60).
-Proposed workshops on leadership and
management not held
-Senior OR nurse provided some training in
waste management to nurses
To establish clinical record keeping and
clinical audit in the operating theatres
as routine management tools, and to
monitor patient intra-operative morbidity
and mortality
-Establish a reporting system to monitor
adverse incidents, peri-operative morbidity
(including infection rates) and mortality.
-Establish a no-blame peri-operative morbidity
and mortality review panel.
-Establish 6-monthly clinical audit meetings
-Create and use appropriate clinical records,
including drug charts.
-At least 1 completed audit in each 6-month
period by each of the 4 professional groups
in operating theatres and recovery.
-Reporting system not established
-Morbidity and mortality review panel not
established
-6-monthly clinical audit meetings not held
-New clinical records not created
-1 audit of cancelled procedures completed
by one of the professional groups; no other
audits reported to be completed by other
groups for the project (although some
Masters students working in the OR
completed audits for course requirements,
separate to the SCI initiative)
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meetings. There was no evidence (anecdotal or audit-
derived) that the goal of improving access to surgical
care for patients (increased OR through-put or reduced
‘down-time’) had been achieved.
To explain these outcomes, we present our findings in
terms of three, interrelated sets of factors pertaining to:
1) the project design, 2) partnership working and 3) the
implementation context in Borodar.
Project design: objectives, resources and strategies
In terms of the QI project itself, we identified obstacles
relating to (mis)understandings of the project objectives
within the SCI team and to mismatches between the
proposed resources, activities and aims.
Understanding of the project objectives
Despite collaborative planning by team leads, as the pro-
ject progressed confusion emerged within the SCI team
over the objectives of the project. While there was broad
agreement that the aim was to improve the functioning
of the OR, different team members had different views
about what activities should be implemented to achieve
this. Particularly towards the end of the project, team
members tended to give a list of objectives (e.g., redu-
cing clutter, instigating use of digital record keeping in
the OR, improving waste management), which differed
from one member to another, and most of which did not
feature in the original proposal.
I think initially we thought it was more about, sort of,
morbidity, mortality and improving any rates that
there were, but it turned out to be more about more,
sort of, basic and ground floor things [..]So I don’t
know that it’s exactly what we set out to do
(project team member, Glennworth)
These divergences resulted in different team members
focusing on separate activities (e.g., training on waste
management for nurses but not other staff, installing
computers for use by surgeons) at the expense of coord-
inating time and efforts towards agreed project objec-
tives. More seriously for the partnership relationship,
disagreement over key activities – such as the number
and direction of overseas visits - resulted in conflict and
frustration between partners.
I was disappointed that I was not involved in deciding
on some of the things, and the other thing is that
[the planned visit] was also not what I wanted to do
(project team member, Borodar)
Mismatched resources, aims and activities
Mismatches between the resources provided by the pro-
ject and those needed to accomplish its aims and activities
were another obstacle to success. The principal resource
deficiency was staff time – this being a volunteer-run pro-
ject. For example, Borodar team members felt hugely
overburdened by existing clinical demands, and struggled
to make time for meetings or implementing activities.
Moreover, they were frequently called away by higher
authorities at the last moment, disrupting planned activi-
ties. Financial pressures in the UK hospital meant that
Glennworth staff found it more difficult than in the past
to obtain permission for annual leave for project visits to
Ethiopia, causing delays to the planned visits.
Establishing clinical audit was another key strategy of
the project. Most OR staff had limited training in clinical
audit. Although Glennworth partners were able to pro-
vide some technical support to some individual team
members (through visits to the UK and email), the
planned training for other OR staff did not take place. In
addition, the OR committee did not include the hospi-
tal’s audit clerk, who had previously undertaken certified
training through the partnership. An opportunity was
missed therefore to utilise this individual’s skills and the
dedicated time s/he had available to support audit within
the hospital.
A further challenge was that many OR staff members
tended to view audit as a potentially punitive tool which
could lead to individuals being blamed, rather than as a
tool for learning. For example, one senior physician des-
cribed being angrily accused of ‘making trouble’ when he
had shared the results of an audit with senior manage-
ment in an effort to raise concerns about quality of care.
As a result, individuals who did attempt to carry out
audits in the OR sometimes encountered significant push-
back from their colleagues. The project design included
little support for overcoming these ‘adaptive’ challenges,
instead focusing planned activities on addressing tech-
nical, skills-based needs.
Partnership working
Significant challenges were encountered in maintaining
effective communication, understanding and coordination
of roles and responsibilities between partners.
Exchange visits – logistical challenges
Exchange visits between Ethiopia and the UK - a key ac-
tivity to facilitate collaborative implementation - proved
particularly problematic. Factors outside the control of
the project team, such as difficulties obtaining visas for
visitors from Ethiopia and personal illness, delayed visits
and the second planned visit by Glennworth partners to
Borodar did not happen. This caused serious delays to
project progress and prevented planned training for OR
staff from taking place.
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It seemed really likely to succeed because there was
enthusiasm on both sides, but it hasn’t succeeded
because there are a lot of external factors [..] the
changes in the NHS meant there were delays in
visits, changes meaning that visas are no longer
reliably obtained by people from Ethiopia
(project team member, Glennworth)
Communication
Between visits, email communication between SCI pro-
ject partners was poor, with emails going unanswered, or
responses too slow or with too little information to allow
project activities to move forward. Partners in the UK
and Ethiopia blamed demanding clinical workloads, as
well as a lack of clarity about who was supposed to send
or answer project-related emails. In Ethiopia these issues
were compounded by limitations in IT resources. The
result was lack of coordination between team members
and uncertainty on both sides about what was happening
or what was planned. Over time, these communication
failures stymied action and contributed to a loss of
motivation on both sides of the partnership.
There is some communication failure also between
us and [Glennworth partners],[..] sometimes decisions
will come from the other side and I really don’t
know anything about it[..] so that is also another
big problem that I observed (project team member,
Borodar)
There was a great delay on both sides, but mainly on
our side actually, on communications, so a month
would go by and it doesn’t seem like very much, but
then, you know, time, it just accumulates and it’s very
frustrating for people waiting for a response. (project
team member, Glennworth)
Communication challenges appeared to have been
compounded by differences in partners’ norms and expec-
tations about appropriate interactions. One prominent ex-
ample of this was how partners chose to communicate
when the project was not progressing according to plan.
On the Glennworth side, partners wanted to be informed
even if the report was not positive; in their view, maintain-
ing communication was the most important indicator of
commitment to the project. Borodar staff suggested that
according to local norms there was a reluctance to share
bad news, such that avoiding disappointing partners was
prioritised over sharing updates.
Project team roles, responsibilities and mutual understanding
Communication was also hampered by a more general
lack of clarity or mutual understanding amongst part-
ners about project roles and responsibilities, particularly
regarding project leadership. There was confusion be-
tween partners and within each partnership team about
who should have oversight of project progress and who
had the authority to finalise decisions and instigate
action.
I said to [another team member], you’re in charge of
this bit, you and [another person] are the people who
are leading it, but they wanted me to do it and I
didn’t want to (project team member, Glennworth)
This confusion was underpinned by a more fundamen-
tal mismatch in partners’ expectations. While Borodar
team members expected Glennworth partners to take
the lead and provide direction (e.g., suggest plans for ad-
dressing the problems identified), Glennworth members
expected the Borodar team to take the lead and saw
their own role as providing assistance in response to
specific requests.
We didn’t do anything, because I thought they would
come and give us some directions and things like that,
that was my thinking (project team member, Borodar)
It was discussed that we would go out there, but we
were really keen they should come here first [..]
I think it needs to be led by them.
(project team member, Glennworth)
Misunderstandings also emerged over the scope of the
role of UK partners in relation to service improvement
locally. For example, tension arose between partners
when the application of hospital policy – rotation of
nurses between different departments – meant that a
key member of the Borodar project team left the OR.
From the perspective of Glennworth partners, this move
undermined the goal of strengthening the management
of the OR, calling the appropriateness of the policy itself
into question. From the perspective of the Borodar part-
ners, such hospital-wide policies, which aimed to ad-
dress wider challenges in hospital management, were felt
to be beyond the scope of the project and therefore out-
side the scope of appropriate intervention from their
partners.
Lack of clarity over roles and responsibilities was fur-
ther complicated due to changes in personnel during the
project (reflecting a wider issue of high staff turnover):
by the end of the project, three of the five OR committee
members were no longer in their original posts and able
to work on the project.
Local implementation context
The implementation context in Borodar presented sig-
nificant challenges for establishing multi-disciplinary
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teamworking and for engaging the wider OR staff in
improvement efforts.
Inter-disciplinary teamwork
The local context was characterised by a tendency for
different professions (nursing, anaesthesia, surgery) to
work in silos, with very few extant, formal structures to
support inter-disciplinary collaboration. At times rela-
tionships between the different professions in the OR
were strained, and conflicts were not uncommon.
They [surgeons] say, “with how many people should we
have to fight? We fight with anaesthesia, then should
we also have to fight with the nurses?” (OR nurse)
Given this context, the ‘adaptive’ work [29] – targeting
culture and systems – of establishing a robustly func-
tioning inter-disciplinary management committee was
perhaps underestimated in the project design. While re-
lationships between the individuals on the committee
were cooperative, the local context made it difficult to
coordinate project activities across the disciplines. Com-
peting demands from within their own disciplinary de-
partments made it hard for committee members to
schedule group meetings. In addition, the relatively junior
position of the surgery and obstetrics-gynaecology repre-
sentatives (both residents) limited their influence within
their own departments, and their efforts tended to be
viewed by colleagues as their personal project, rather than
a collectively-owned departmental activity.
Engaging OR staff: hierarchy, resource scarcity and
structural constraints
The OR committee included representatives of each of
the frontline professions working in the OR – surgery,
obstetrics-gynaecology, anaesthetics, nursing – as well as
the two hospital senior managers. All the frontline OR
committee members lacked seniority, however. The ob-
stetrics and surgical representatives were residents and
although the nursing representative was the senior OR
nurse, he lacked authority over non-nursing OR staff. In
a steeply hierarchical context, this lack of authority
proved very limiting to their efforts to secure compli-
ance from senior surgeons in particular.
The relationship between workers here is the
relationship of boss and servant. The relationship is
mostly based on inferiority and superiority. No sprit of
team work at all. (OR nurse)
He [senior nurse] needs help from the physician’s side,
but the doctors are a problem even for us, definitely
there is, especially the senior doctors, they don’t
cooperate. (project team member, Borodar)
Many OR staff were unaware of the SCI project or its
aims, as were UK doctors working in the OR on other
partnership projects. OR staff who were aware of the
project tended to view it as the project of one or two in-
dividuals, and any activities as their sole responsibility,
indicating a lack of shared ownership amongst the wider
OR staff.
Most of the things probably the surgeons don’t know
about, I don’t know about this project [..] they did
appoint some people, the improvement committee, […]
they can discuss the problems and find a solution, but
all those things are the responsibility of this OR
improvement committee. (surgeon)
Although many OR staff agreed that resources could
be better managed (e.g., many complained that time and
resources were wasted due to poor organisation), all those
interviewed saw increasing resources as the “burning
issue” they wanted addressed. This is somewhat contra-
dictory to the assumption underpinning the project design
that deficiencies in the functioning of the OR were
“not due to lack of staff or skill or undue financial
pressure ….but due to the deployment of these re-
sources” (project proposal). As a result, those staff who
were aware of the project were skeptical or indifferent
to efforts to introduce changes in practices or policies
in so far as they thought the project was not tackling
the main problem they faced.
We don’t have simple gloves […] So how can people be
happy to work? Whatever new policy, they don’t accept
[..] unless you correct such very minor problems, how
can you correct the big problems, how can you make
people change? (surgeon)
Overseas visits also appeared to be a source of tension
between project staff and other Borodar OR staff. The
opportunity for learning and professional development
offered by visits to hospitals in countries such as the UK
was rare but highly sought after. Some SCI team mem-
bers suggested other OR staff felt decisions about who
visited the UK partner hospital were unfair or inappro-
priate, and reported hearing rumours that staff who
visited the UK through the SCI project had received per-
sonal, financial gain from doing so. Such rumours were
likely exacerbated by a concurrent WHO project which
had provided high daily allowances to staff who had
undertaken WHO-supported visits to the UK. While
SCI team members had not received daily allowances
during visits, they nonetheless felt that such misunder-
standings contributed to the resistance they encoun-
tered from OR colleagues in their efforts to implement
project activities.
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The hospital managers involved in the project were
the most senior managers in the hospital. Due to the
duties of this role in addition to clinical work, and the
tendency for senior leaders to be called away from the
hospital by regional or national authorities with little
warning, senior leaders found it hard to actively partici-
pate in project activities, despite expressing much sup-
port for its importance. They also felt their ability to
control or influence healthcare workers was limited.
I tried, I struggled so many times to establish an OR
policy, but it was not an easy thing, because people
were not cooperative (senior manager, project team
member, Borodar)
Many of the reasons for this relate to the wider con-
text. For example, the scarcity of human resources made
it more difficult for managers to control doctors who,
they felt, could easily move to other jobs. Low salaries,
combined with demanding workloads in challenging ma-
terial conditions were felt to contribute to low morale
and motivation amongst healthcare workers, while also
making it difficult for managers to identify incentives to
help secure compliance.
You know, they are here because they don’t have any
other choice, the amount of money that they get is very
small and they are not really well motivated […]we
don’t do anything from the higher office, because if you
do it’s going to affect them so much (senior manager)
In this particular context, there were additional struc-
tural constraints that limited the influence of hospital
managers over surgeons. In Ethiopia, most teaching
hospitals fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Education and are managed through their associated
university. As a result, surgeons were employed by and
accountable to the University whose first priority was
academic rather than clinical. Thus hospital managers
could not, for example, mandate that surgeons adhered
to any of the new processes the improvement committee
attempted to introduce.
Another structural obstacle to project progress and
sustained engagement of the wider OR community was
high staff turnover in the OR, particularly amongst
nurses and trainees. This limited the beneficial impact of
the training that was conducted, and made it more diffi-
cult for the project team to maintain awareness of and
support for the project amongst OR staff.
The OR, is a very very, hardworking place, and you
have to work the whole day, the whole night, and then
the next day, so [nurses] get exhausted, so after some
time, they say “I’m leaving” (surgeon)
Discussion
The SCI project aimed to strengthen the organisation and
management of surgical services in Borodar University
Hospital through establishing a multi-disciplinary man-
agement committee, training OR staff and establishing
clinical audit as a routine management tool. Despite the
efforts of an enthusiastic and dedicated group of indi-
viduals, and broad agreement that improved manage-
ment of the OR was much needed, the SCI project
largely failed to achieve its goals. The context of inter-
vention was a challenging one of resource constraints,
high staff turnover, poor inter-disciplinary coordination
and steep authority gradients within and between profes-
sions in the OR. These challenges are not unique to this
hospital, nor the Ethiopian healthcare system [2, 7, 30]. In
discussing the findings of this process evaluation, our
intention is not to focus on resolving the contextual
constraints per se, but to generate lessons for optimising
quality improvement interventions within such challen-
ging healthcare contexts, with specific reference to inter-
national partnership-based approaches.
Strengthening project design and partnership working
A major problem for the SCI project were disagreements
and ‘drift’ concerning project goals and strategies, and
confusion over project roles and responsibilities. High
staff turnover and delays caused by factors beyond the
control of the project team undoubtedly contributed to
the confusion and drift over time, but our findings also
point to lessons for improving project design, collaborative
planning and mutual understanding between partners.
Communication difficulties were significant, and af-
fected implementation in practical ways (e.g., under-
mining coordination, delaying action), as well as negatively
impacting on the relationships and motivation of team
members. These were critical resources given the reliance
on volunteerism and the challenges of finding the time for
project work given existing pressures on clinical staff. Plans
for communication (as well as implementation activities)
need to be part of project design. Explicit agreement
should be reached at the outset of a project about ex-
pected frequency of project updates or ‘virtual’ meetings,
preferred mode(s) of communication and who has the au-
thority to speak on behalf of others. It should include
plans for periodically reviewing goals and strategies and
renewing consensus as a team so that new learning can be
incorporated without undermining coordination. Given
local IT limitations, a small budget to support the costs of
accessing reliable communication platforms may be
needed; expanding the range of potential communication
platforms may also be beneficial (e.g., Skype, WhatsApp,
Dropbox etc.) [31]. Communication amongst team
members on the same arm of the partnership should
not be obscured by the focus on communication
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challenges between partners, however: our findings show
that misunderstandings and confusion were also due to lack
of dialogue between team members in the same hospital.
Our findings also point to more fundamental chal-
lenges for dialogue and mutual understanding, relating
to mismatched expectations between partners about ap-
propriate dialogue and sharing of information. Although
the Glennworth-Borodar partnership was long standing,
with many successful collaborations in the past, our
findings suggest that longevity is not sufficient to ensure
mutual understanding of partners’ roles and appropriate
forms of interaction between the individuals involved in
a specific project (some for the first time). This is per-
haps not surprising, as smooth collaboration within part-
nerships is a common challenge in all fields [20]. The
beliefs and assumptions underpinning expectations of
partnership roles, as well as project-specific roles, need
to be made explicit, and differences or contradictions re-
solved. This should include explicit consideration and
agreement on the scope – and boundaries – of the pro-
posed, collaborative intervention. While short-term QI
projects clearly should be aligned with wider organisa-
tional goals, and may contribute to their development,
our findings highlight the tensions for international part-
ners raised by the interdependence of contexts and pro-
jects. In the longer-term, there is a need to address the
hospital and system-level contextual constraints that can
undermine specific QI efforts. But difficult questions
arose about the extent to which wider hospital policies
or systems were considered a legitimate ‘target’ for the
project and the involvement of international partners. In
challenging contexts such as this one, the boundaries of
short-term, narrowly focused QI projects may be inherently
‘fuzzy’ and particularly complex for partnership-based ap-
proaches to negotiate.
Establishing teams, relationships and mutual under-
standing of the objectives and scope of a project neces-
sarily takes time, but one approach to facilitating mutual
understanding is to develop a concordat for each project
undertaken by a partnership [32]. This should include
agreement not only on what should be done, but how,
making explicit the skills and support needed and/or ex-
pected. It should be a participatory process involving all
team members, as the process of surfacing and discussing
expectations is likely to be as valuable to sustaining good
collaborative relations as the output itself (the concordat)
[32]. Such a process takes time, and, in the context of an
international project may be difficult to facilitate be-
fore funding is secured. An important lesson from our
findings, then, is the need for a ‘lead-in phase’, once
funding is secured, to allow greater attention to inter-
vention design and planning with the involvement of all
those to be directly engaged in implementation. Funding
cycles may also need to be extended to allow time for
teams, relationships and mutual agreements to be estab-
lished, as short funding cycles of 12 to 18 months may
make it hard to resist a rush to implementation [9].
Tailoring implementation to context in resource-
constrained settings
Another key area of difficulty for the SCI project was
securing buy-in and support from other OR staff. The
challenge of convincing staff that the problem being
targeted is indeed a problem, or that it is the ‘right’
problem to target, is by no means unique to LIC con-
texts [9]. Our findings do suggest, though, that some
features of LIC contexts may amplify these common
challenges. First, resource constraints affected healthcare
improvement efforts in particular ways. Lack of engage-
ment stemmed in part from mismatches in the rationale
of the project (that improvements could be made within
existing resources) and the dominant perception that the
‘burning issue’ that needed addressing was the need to in-
crease resources. In a context of stark material deprivation,
it may arguably be harder to demonstrate the relative
advantage of an intervention that did not directly seek to
increase resources. Drawing on an observational study of a
successful QI project in Rwanda, Kotogal and colleagues
(2009) conclude that while QI tools can improve resource
management, in resource-poor settings sustained change
also requires augmenting resources [7]. The potential for
the allocation of project-related resources and opportunities
(e.g., for overseas visits or training), to engender resentment
and resistance also presented challenges. As other suc-
cessful projects have found, extrinsic motivators can be
a valuable addition but require transparency and sensi-
tive handling [33].
Second, a shorter national and local history of quality
improvement and a low-base of staff morale meant that
the scale of the adaptive challenges related to developing
systems and a culture supportive of improvement efforts
were particularly acute. For example, introducing clinical
audit as a routine management tool required technical
solutions, such as developing tools and training individuals.
Some of this was provided, although obstacles outside the
project team’s control prevented planned training work-
shops from being carried out. However, establishing rou-
tine audit also encountered sociocultural obstacles, namely
a tendency to see audit as a potentially punitive tool (rather
than a tool for improvement) and consequently resistance
to its routine use. Similarly, establishing multi-disciplinary
management of the OR was not simply a technical or
practical task, but one which required adaptive solutions
[29] to overcome structural inhibitors and deeply en-
grained professional norms that ran counter to multidis-
ciplinary cooperation and collaborative management.
It is especially important, then, that QI projects in
LICs include explicit strategies to secure buy-in and to
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overcome the adaptive challenges as well as the (perhaps
more easily identifiable) technical challenges. In the SCI
project, rather than allow the logic of the intervention to
speak for itself, more needed to be done to communicate
the rationale behind the proposed changes to OR
management and practices. Opportunities were needed
(e.g., at routine staff meetings) for discussion and the
airing of objections as part of process of engagement
[34], and to establish the collective benefit of the pro-
ject and avoid the perception that the project ‘belonged’
to a few individuals.
For projects such as the SCI, largely reliant on volun-
teerism and persuasion in a context of relatively low staff
morale, seeing results may help motivate enthusiasm
and sustain commitment to improvement efforts [7, 33].
Another strategy to enhance engagement may be to
identify and target low-hanging fruit, and so allow for
‘small-wins’ to be demonstrated early on, rather than
aim only for ambitious, longer-term goals [9, 35].
Overseas visits were a particularly contentious aspect
of the project – a source of delay due to logistical diffi-
culties, of disagreement within the project team and of
resentment from other OR staff members. Visits to the
UK were highly valued in that they allowed for face-to-
face discussions, the opportunity to learn and generate
new ideas, and, for those making visits, were highly mo-
tivating. However, it was unclear that this value offset
the delays and tensions they also engendered. An alter-
native may be to identify high-performing hospitals
within country (or the region) and for international part-
ners to visit those hospitals together. This would allow
learning from other, high-performing sites, decrease
logistical obstacles and funds spent on overseas travel,
and counter resistance based on objections that what is
done in the UK is inapplicable locally.
The importance of adaptive solutions and securing
buy-in also underscores the need for leaders with the
professional status, seniority or organisational position
to influence decision making and the conduct of their
colleagues [5, 7, 36]. While hierarchy is feature of
healthcare and surgery globally, this differential is often
more marked LIC settings [5]. Fragmented lines of
authority within the institution, and the gap between the
authority that team members’ professional or organisa-
tional position afforded them and that needed to persuade
other OR staff to support the improvement efforts, indi-
cate involvement of departmental heads and university
(not just hospital) leadership would have benefitted the
SCI project. Project leadership needs to reflect the
specific, local accountability structures and include those
at the highest level [31].
It is important to recognise, though, that in any setting
power dynamics often extend beyond formal structures
of authority and accountability [37]. As others have
found [36], managers in our setting reported feeling
they had little control over staff and few ‘hard edges’ at
their disposal. It may help leaders, therefore, to articu-
late more clearly how short-term projects align with
existing interests and the wider ‘direction of travel’ of
the organisation (e.g., in this case, the links between the
goals of the SCI and the Ethiopian Hospital Reform
Implementation Guidelines). Moreover, as Bradley et al.
[16] argue, management is not simply based on tech-
nical expertise but a process learned over time, and
thus strengthening management may require on-going
face to face mentoring in addition to short-term, didac-
tic technical training.
Conclusions
Through a process evaluation of an intervention which
aimed to improve the management of surgical services,
and identifying the barriers to implementation, we have
sought to generate lessons for optimising quality im-
provement interventions in LICs. Although based on a
single case, we have identified barriers which are com-
mon to improvement interventions in diverse settings,
as well as obstacles relating to contextual features which
are common to many LIC settings. We have also identi-
fied challenges relating to international partnership-based
approaches specifically. We therefore hope the lessons
generated may be useful for others seeking to conduct
healthcare quality improvement in LICs, including
through international partnerships.
Key lessons include:
□ The need for a funded lead-in phase to enable
clarification and agreement on roles, responsibilities
and the skills, support and resources needed by
those charged with implementation; this should be
participatory, and include plans for sustaining
effective communication both within and between
partnership teams;
□ The need to explicitly incorporate adaptive, as well
as technical, solutions, and strategies for engaging those
not directly involved in the project; this includes
allowing space for debate and challenge of the project
goals and rationale, avoiding excess ambition and
allowing for early, small wins;
□ The importance of careful and transparent
management of the allocation of resources and
opportunities for professional development, and
realistic evaluation of the additional resources needed
to address technical and adaptive challenges;
□ The need to identify and engage local leaders
whose professional status and organisational position
afford them authority and influence given local
formal and informal structures of power and
accountability;
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□ The importance of identifying and articulating links
between project goals and wider organisational interests
and priorities, while also recognising and agreeing the
scope of the QI project.
Developing the relationships and mutual understanding
to underpin collaborative work, and laying the ground-
work to create alignment, engage staff and promote local
ownership takes time, especially where geographical and
cultural distances need be crossed. An important lesson
for funders, then, is to avoid funding cycles that are too
short to avert an unhelpful, if well-intentioned, rush to
implementation.
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